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Athena Skoulariki*
CONSPIRACY THEORIES BEFORE 
AND AFTER THE GREEK CRISIS: 
DISCURSIVE PATTERNS AND POLITICAL 
USE OF THE ‘ENEMY’ THEME
Conspiracy theories have been associated with a paranoid way of
thinking; however they are not always marginal and utterly irra-
tional. Conspiracist narratives reflect rival strategies of interpreta-
tion, and can have a real impact on the social and political praxis. Over
and above factual accuracy, I suggest that what distinguishes a con-
spiracy theory is a type of discourse, its key features being: suspi-
cion, intentionality, personification, speculation and denunciation. 
This paper examines conspiracy theories that dominated Greek
public discourse before and after the economic crisis of the 2010s,
particularly those introduced by political actors as a means of po-
litical persuasion and mobilisation. Greek political culture and the
discredit of the political system since 2010 led to frequent expres-
sions of distrust towards political elites and foreign “powers”. My
analysis focuses on the acceptability of conspiracy theories in rela-
tion with social representations, dominant stereotypes and widely
shared interpretative schemata. 
The following cases of conspiracy theories are discussed: a) the
wildfires that ravaged large parts of Greece in 2007, supposedly set
* Lecturer, Sociology of Communication, University of Crete <e-mail: skou -
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by ‘foreign agents’; b) the alleged assassination plot in 2008-2009
against the PM Karamanlis by Western / US secret services; c) the
conspiracy theories attributing the economic crisis to a deliberate
foreign plot against Greece. The paper examines in particular the
attribution of blame to presumed ‘enemies’, in line with nationalist
discursive themes and stereotypes.
Introduction
THE ANALYSIS of public discourse in contemporary Greece of-
ten draws attention to its populist dimension. Connected to some
extent to populism,1 but having a distinct epistemological inte -
rest, is the question of conspiracy theories, which have become
increasingly manifest in the Greek public sphere over the past
decade. This paper aims to discuss the specificities of conspira -
cist rhetoric in Greece, focusing on political discourse and, more
precisely, on conspiracy narratives introduced by political leaders
and state officials.
Although conspiracy theories have been associated with a
paranoid way of thinking (Hofstadter 1965), they are indeed not
always marginal, nor utterly irrational, whereas the impact of
even the most outrageous narratives is very real. Moreover, their
use for purposes of manipulation, political persuasion and pro-
paganda should not be underestimated.
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1. Populist and conspiracist discourse converge in the dualistic, absolute
and essentialist distinction between those who are seen as genuinely good (the
people perceived as a homogenous entity) and those who are depicted as power -
ful, corrupted elites (national or supra-national). Paul Taggart (2000: 105) wro -
te on the issue: ‘The populist tendency to demonize elites and to see danger
around them leads them to be particularly susceptible to such theories. Bringing
together various groups such as bankers, politicians, intellectuals and captains
of industry, it is a short step to the claim that they are in cahoots, as part of a
conspiracy.’ The suspicion towards the ‘system’ and the rhetoric of denuncia -
tion are also common features. Conspiracy theories are often embodied in pop-
ulist and nationalist discourses. However, populism does not imply that pow-
er groups only operate in secret, nor that they pull the strings in all situations. 
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To begin with, the question is how to define a ‘conspiracy
theory’, since the same case is seen by others as a genuine conspi -
racy. Bale (2007: 46) has observed that scholars, unwilling to
deal with such controversial matters, ‘often deny the importance
–if  not the actual existence– of  real clandestine and covert po-
litical activities’; he argues that a ‘clear-cut analytical distinc-
tion’ needs to be made between ‘bogus conspiracy theories’ and
‘actual conspiratorial politics’, which are a common feature of
political history (Bale 2007: 48-50).
Historian Carlo Ginzburg remarked that ‘conspiracies exist
and, false conspiracies often conceal true ones’, and posed the
question: ‘Is it possible to trace a dividing line between a healthy
skepticism toward certain official versions and a conspiratorial
obsession?’ (Ginzburg 2012: 164, Taguieff 2013: 25)
Undoubtedly, there is a level of subjectivity and a need for
case by case examination. But more than the factual inaccuracies,
I will argue that what distinguishes a conspiracy theory is a type
of discourse.2 Let me stress some of its key features: 
a) the distrustful rhetoric vis-à-vis mainstream politics (or
generally ‘the system’), especially in regards to their transparen-
cy, and the obsession with parts of reality that are allegedly kept
secret from the public.3 It is combined with an alarmist approach,
emphasising risks, usually pertaining to political or economic
domination, (inter)national security, or public health issues.
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2. Hofstadter (1996 [1965]: 5) has already stressed the importance of
rhetoric, when referring to the ‘paranoid style’ of conspiracy theories, pré-
cising that ‘Style has to do with the way in which ideas are believed and ad-
vocated rather with the truth or falsity of their content.’ In this sense, I argue
that the same story (e.g. the Kennedy assassination) can be narrated or re-
ported, either in a balanced way, presenting different opinions or hypothe-
ses with counterarguments, or, on the contrary, using conspiracist rhetoric,
denouncing an obscure plot in absolute, alarmist and sensational terms.
3. D. H. Fischer described as the ‘furtive fallacy’ the ‘idea that every-
thing that is truly significant happens behind the scenes’; David Hackett Fis-
cher, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, New York:
Harper and Row, 1970: 74-78; quoted in Bale 2007: 58.
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b) the idea that negative events are deliberately planned and
orchestrated by powerful actors, influential minorities, under-
cover agents, or other ‘power’ structures, who serve their prop-
er interests. Intention is the primary explanatory principle (Mo -
scovici 1987: 156). To quote Pierre-André Taguieff (2013: 15),
conspiracy theories explain social phenomena ‘by identifying the
hidden plans of  a person or group, which constitute [their] neces -
sary and sufficient cause’. The presumption of guilt is based on
the criterion of ‘cui bono?’ (for whose benefit?). Structural causes,
open political processes, the antagonism between social groups,
and complex power relations are not taken into account. Instead,
‘for conspiracy theorists, conspiracies are not simply a regular
feature of  politics whose importance varies in different historical
contexts, but rather the motive force of  all historical change and
development’ (Bale 2007: 52).4
c) the rejection of randomness or coincidence (Barkun 2003:
3-4, Taguieff 2013: 42), and the inability to acknowledge that
multiple factors affect the course of events. According to the con-
spiracy mentality, coincidences are never accidental, they are indi -
cative of hidden connexions, which are used to explain the causes
of events (Taguieff 2013: 14). 
As suggested by Hofstadter (1996 [1965]: 39), people or groups
who feel that they have no access to the political bargaining and
decision-making, the ones who feel excluded from the regular
political process, tend to conceive ‘the world of  power as om-
nipotent, sinister, and malicious’. Research has demonstrated
how a sense of powerlessness and of lack of control (Whitson &
Galinsky 2008: 115-117), as well as the inability to grasp the com-
plexity of reality, are leading certain people to believe imagina-
tive conspiracy theories, which however are schematic in their
structure: negative events are caused by evil people with bad in-
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4. Bale (2007: 53) also points out: ‘It is precisely this totalistic, all-en-
compassing quality that distinguishes ‘conspiracy theories’ from the secret
but often mundane political planning that is carried out on a daily basis by
all sorts of groups, both within and outside of government.’
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tentions. Their plans never fail, whatever happens was the exact
realisation of their authors’ intention (Taguieff 2013: 15).
d) the rejection of ‘official’ or ‘first level’ narratives and ex-
planations, and the adoption of ‘alternative’ scenarios, which are
not based on substantial evidence or even plausible indications,
but rather on speculation. Paradoxically, while official accounts
are met with extreme suspicion and disbelief, conspiracy theories
are not subject to critical scrutiny by their advocates (Taguieff
2015: 55). 
e) the denunciation of a ‘culprit’, usually a group, who is to
blame for the conspiracy, and who eventually serves as a ‘scape-
goat’. Perceived as powerful and malevolent (Glick 2005: 255),
the group targeted is not chosen arbitrarily;5 it represents a ‘usu-
al suspect’, according to one’s prejudice and/or ideology.6 By
identifying a culprit, a conspiracy theory lifts the burden of un-
certainty and gives to people the feeling that they can act – in
particular, against the group in question (Barkun 2003: 4).
Notwithstanding the psychological explanations of people’s
tendency to adopt a conspiracist worldview, Barkun argues that
these kinds of beliefs ‘alert us to the existence of  significant sub-
cultures far outside the mainstream’, which in times of crisis may
have a potent influence in politics. In some cases therefore, con-
spiracist ideas may become a cultural norm (Barkun 2003: 2, 8)
In this paper, I will discuss some Greek conspiracy case stud-
ies that are based to a certain extent on real plots or clandestine
operations, but which gave rise to conspiracy theories way out of
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5. On the process of stereotyping and social categorisation leading to
scapegoating, related to the research on prejudice, see: Glick 2005: 244-261
and Brown 1995.
6. According to Glick (2005: 247), in the last decades, research on scape-
goating focused ‘on the roles of shared (collective) frustrations (e.g. economic
collapse, social disorder) that produce social movements with scapegoating
ideologies that lead to organized persecution. Frustration’s role thus becomes
indirect, with ideology being the proximal cause of aggression.’ More specifi -
cally, his approach emphasises ‘the role of culturally shared beliefs, stereo-
types and ideologies’ (Glick 2005: 251).
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all proportion to the facts. The aim is to highlight the charac-
teristics of conspiracy narratives in Greece from the year 2004
and on, i.e. before and after the 2010s financial crisis.
My analysis focuses on the acceptability of specific conspir-
acy theories in relation with social representations, dominant
stereotypes and widely shared interpretative schemata.7 It also fo-
cuses on the conscious use of conspiracy theories by political ac-
tors as a means of political persuasion and mobilisation, or as a
way of avoiding responsibility for failures and of denouncing ad-
versaries. The conclusions one can draw are of general interest
for the study of conspiracist discourse and its uses.
The Greek context
Greece is a country where conspiracy theories often find fertile
ground in which to spread, due to several structural reasons: a) a
school education that does not encourage critical thinking, often
reproducing national stereotypes, a victimised perception of
Greek history (Antoniou et al. 2015: 8) and a particularly ethno-
centric point of view (Frangoudaki and Dragona 1997); b) a tra-
dition of partisan media (Papathanassopoulos 2001, Komninou
2017), which favour the expression of opinion and of political
commentary over verified facts and analysis; also a significant
number of populist newspapers that excel in speculation, disin-
formation, and in the demonisation of the adversary;8 c) a politi-
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7. Serge Moscovici (1987: 157) remarked that the function of conspira-
cy theory is not to offer a plausible cause of events, but rather ‘it responds
to the need to integrate one’s image of society in one cause’, ‘it integrates peo-
ple’s mind-set and prevents any “rupture” in their mentality’. He associates
conspiracy mentality to a social representation, and underlines that ‘we are
dealing with very familiar widespread images.’
8. The role of the media in the proliferation of conspiracy theories is of
particular interest. Not only they circulate conspiracy theories in mass audien ces,
but most importantly they have an impact on the formation of the conspi racy
mentality per se: news media tend to present and analyse events through the
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cal culture marked by the bitter experience of multiple foreign
interventions, some of them behind the scenes – such as the sup-
port of the 1967 military junta by the CIA, and generally the role
of Britain and the US after the Second World War (Couloumbis
et al. 1976, Papachelas 1998). 
These and other factors, namely the discredit the political
system has fallen into since 2010, lead to frequent expressions of
distrust and suspicion towards political elites and foreign ‘powers’.
In such an environment, conspiracy theories abound. Yet, along
with the conspiracy narratives that spread among the public
through inter-personal communication, specialised publications
or the internet, there were other cases in which conspiracy the-
ories were introduced by official sources (government, state in-
telligence, politicians) and were reproduced by the media, be-
fore they reached the wider public. 
Especially after 2004, under the government of the right-wing
Nea Demokratia, public discourse was regularly submerged in
an avalanche of conspiracy theories,9 some of which were ema-
nating from the political system itself. Since 2010, the economic
crisis and its socio-political consequences gave a further boost to
conspiracist thinking, its main theme being the interpretation
of the crisis10 as the consequence of a supposedly deliberate fo -
reign attack against Greece.
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prism of individual actors, while they disregard complex accounts implicating
social structures and social relations. Additionally, they often seek ‘culprits’ and
try to establish individual responsibility for negative developments, thus cul-
tivating a frame of interpretation which leads to conspiracism (Emke 2000).
9. The first conspiracist accounts of secret operations during this pe-
riod were the ‘wiretapping scandal’ against members of the government by
foreign (US) intelligence, revealed in March 2005, which will be mentioned
later in this paper, and the abduction of Pakistani immigrants by foreign
(British) secret services related to an anti-terrorist investigation in July 2005,
which was refuted by the government, before it was proven to be true. Al-
though these stories were not fictions, they gave rise to conspiracy theories
in the media and the political discourse.
10. For a discussion of the concept of crisis as a social/discursive con-
struct, see Stavrakakis et al. 2017. The authors quote Colin Hay, according
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In an attempt to discuss the issue, I am proposing to explore
the public discourse11 on two cases of conspiracy theories that
present a particular interest: a) the wildfires that ravaged large parts
of Greece in 2007 and were attributed to arson by foreign agents;
b) the alleged assassination plot against the (then) PM Kostas
Karamanlis by Western/US secret services in 2008. 
Those two cases do not concern conspiracy theories spread
by rumours, marginal websites or fringe publications, but rather
conspiracy theories that were introduced by mainstream media,
emanating from political parties or members of the government,
and were even considered as credible by the judiciary, which
launched an official investigation. Although they prompted rea -
ctions and political debate, they were widely reproduced and
were eventually adopted by part of the general public. 
My hypothesis is that these ‘official’ discourses referring to
international plots against Greece prepared the ground for the
widespread conspiracy-oriented interpretations of the crisis in
the following years, as will be discussed in the second part of this
paper. 
ATHENA SKOULARIKI80
to whom ‘Crises are representations, and hence ‘constructions’ of failure’, as well
as Moffit (2015: 195, 198), who stressed that ‘populist actors actively perform
and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather than simply reacting to external cri-
sis’; ‘populist actors actively participate in the ‘spectacularization of failure’
that underlies crisis, allowing them to pit ‘the people’ against a dangerous
other […]’. Therefore, ‘systemic failure and “crisis” – that is to say crisis nar-
ratives – are not to be confused with each other.’(Stavrakakis et al. 2017: 7)
11. This study is based on a qualitative, hermeneutic approach, using
discourse analysis (Bonnafous, Krieg-Planque 2013; Charaudeau, Maingue-
neau 2002; Howarth 2000; Wodak, Meyer 2001) and framing theory (Gamson
et al. 1992; Gamson, Modigliani 1989; Entman 1993). The corpus of discourse
was selected on the base of relevance with the object of research, that is the
public statements and news media excerpts using conspiracist rhetoric about
the issues under study: the wildfires of 2007 (period covered: 2007-2017),
the assassination plot against PM Karamanlis (2008-2017), and the causes of
the Greek economic crisis (2010-2017). Due to the big number of news me-
dia reproducing the same information, the citation of media reports is not ex-
haustive, in order to avoid redundancy.
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Case studies
a) Foreign agents causing the 2007 wildfires
In July and August 2007, a series of wildfires ravaged Greece,
namely the mountains of Attica, surrounding Athens, as well as
the Peloponnese. In total, 2.700km2 of land were ravaged by fire
and at least 67 people died. Although, wildfires occur every year
during the summer, this disaster was not comparable to anything
experienced before. Many reasons can be advanced to partly ex-
plain the expansion of the wildfires and the lack of adequate re-
sponse by the competent authorities: a) climate conditions: there
was a severe drought and strong winds; and b) organisational
and infrastructure shortcomings at the central, regional and local
level. When the fires reached the archaeological site of Ancient
Olympia and burned its surroundings, the government of Kostas
Karamanlis faced public outcry. The unprecedented number of ca -
sualties was shocking. 
In an apparent attempt to divert public opinion from pointing
to state responsibilities,12 members of the government claimed
that the country was ‘under attack’, facing an ‘asymmetric threat’13
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12. For a detailed report on the communication strategy developed by
the government for the management of the wildfires crisis, see: G. Terzis, ‘Οι
δύσκολες ηµέρες στο Μέγαρο Μαξίµου’, Καθηµερινή, 2 September 2007
http://www.kathimerini.gr/296668/article/epikairothta/politikh/oi-dyskoles-
hmeres-sto-megaro-ma3imoy (retrieved 10 August 2017). The article quotes
a ‘source close to PM Karamanlis’ who revealed what would be the ‘spin’:
‘The citizens’ rage will fall upon the arsonists’, he said. 
13. Statements by the Minister of Public Order, Vyron Polydoras, (‘Β.
Πολύδωρας: Ασύµµετρη Αειλή’, Capital, 26 August 2007, http://www.cap-
ital.gr/story/349582/b-poludoras-asummetri-apeili (retrieved 10 August
2017)), and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dora Bakoyanni (initially on
26 August while speaking with journalists off the record), who later explai -
ned that she was referring to the (Greek) anarchists who might have started
‘burning outside of Athens in order to undermine the state’; ‘Μα κο -
γιάννη κατά γνωστών-αγνώστων’, Καθηµερινή, 29 August 2007, http://
www.kathimerini.gr/296214/article/epikairothta/politikh/mpakogiannh-kata-
gnwstwn-agnwstwn (retrieved 10 August 2017)
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(an expression borrowed from the US vocabulary of the so-called
‘War against Terror’), and insinuated that foreign agents were
acting as arsonists in order to destabilise Greece. Most media
and especially the pro-government populist press backed these
claims and gave extensive coverage to conspiracy scenarios (Skou -
lariki 2007, Iliadeli 2010). 
Despite the reactions from the opposition and the subse-
quent political debate on the issue, it seems that the public large-
ly adhered to the conspiracy theory advanced by the govern-
ment.14 Confronted with an exceptional natural disaster, people
were searching for an exceptional cause. The multitude of coin-
ciding circumstances leading to the expansion of the wildfires
was difficult to assess. ‘So many fires, at the same time, in dif-
ferent parts of  the country, can’t be a coincidence’, PM Kara-
manlis hinted at first.15 ‘Certainly, all this cannot be accidental’,
insisted the gover nment spokesperson.16 ‘There was a hand be-
hind all this’, argued another minister.17 The media inflated the
issue even more. The dramatic news was announced by private
TV channels with titles such as: ‘Our country is targeted’,18 while
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14. According to the poll organised by Public Issue/VPRC in August
2007, 67% of the respondents answered ‘probably yes, they are’ to the
question: ‘Are the wildfires an organised plot against the country?’; ‘Οργή
αλλά και αίσθηµα εθνικής αειλής’, Καθηµερινή, 29 August 2007; in de-
tails: http://www.publicissue.gr/33/ & http://www.publicissue.gr/wp-con-
tent/gallery/varometro-kyma-2o-aug07-1-pyrkagies/Slide4.JPG (retrieved:
24 July 2017)
15. Televised address of PM Karamanlis, 25 August 2007; see: Chr.
Corai, ‘Σενάρια Συνωµοσίας…’, Ελευθεροτυπία, 27 August 2007.
16. Thodoris Rousopoulos, statement quoted in K. Melissopoulos,
‘Υαινιγµοί Ρουσόουλου για οργανωµένο καταστροϕικό σχέδιο’, Βρα-
δυνή, 28 August 2007.
17. Michalis Kefaloyannis, Minister of the Marine, Antenna TV news,
31 August 2007. 
18.  Antenna TV news, 26 August 2007. The anchorman of Antenna,
Nikos Evangelatos, went on air saying: ‘Ladies and gentlemen, the country
is under attack’. For more details about the media coverage of the wildfires,
see Skoulariki 2007. 
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newspapers wrote about ‘enemy plots’19 and ‘warfare’20 (Skou la -
riki 2007).
Many news media reproduced unofficial statements incrimi -
nating ‘foreign agents’,21 while some insinuated that the US se-
cret services could be behind the wildfires. ‘Operation chaos:
The dirty plan of  foreign secret services is being deployed, they set
fires to Greece, they inflamed the elections, they are demolishing
the system, The Minister of  Public Order spoke about an Asym-
metric Threat’, were the headlines of populist daily Avriani.22 ‘A
terrorist mastermind behind the fires?’, was the question that
dominated the front page of Adesmeutos Typos.23
Others blamed Balkan nationals, targeting in particular those
who are stereotypically seen as ‘enemies’: Albanians, Kosovars
and ‘Skopjans with Albanian passports’ – they even named a cer-
tain ‘Danilo from Kosovo’24 (Skoulariki 2007, Iliadeli 2010: 73-
75). Their purpose would have been to ‘undermine’ and ‘desta-
bilise’ the country. Although some articles gave extensive details
about the secret operations, allegedly based on leaks from the
Greek Intelligence Service, no more explanations were given re-
garding the motives of what was named an ‘anti-Greek crime’.25
The claim that agents of neighbouring countries were be-
hind wildfires in Greece was not new. The Turkish secret servi -
ces had been openly accused by politicians and news media over
similar cases in the past, especially concerning acts of arson in
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19. ‘Εχθρικό σχέδιο κατά της ατρίδας µας’, Απογευµατινή, 27 Au-
gust 2007.
20. ‘Πόλεµος. Η Ελλάδα δέχεται είθεση’, Χώρα, 27 August 2007.
21. ‘Ξένοι ράκτορες µας “καίνε”’, Ακρόπολις, 28 August 2007.
22. Αυριανή, 28 August 2007; quoted in Iliadeli 2010: 69-70. On 17 Au-
gust, the government had called for early elections to be held on 16 Sep-
tember, which the ruling party of Nea Demokratia won, without being in-
flicted any damage from the wildfires affair.
23. Αδέσµευτος Τύπος, 26 August 2007.
24. ‘The Kosovar “Danilo” is indicated by the EYP [i.e. the National
Intelligence Service] as the mastermind of the network of arsonists who bur -
ned down Greece’; frontpage headline of Αυριανή, 28 August 2007.
25. Ibid: 16-17; quoted in Iliadeli 2010: 75.
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the Aegean islands. This claim was not totally unfounded. For-
mer Turkish PM Mesut Yilmaz admitted in 2011 that secret state
funds were allocated for such operations in the mid-1990s.26
Based on the above and proceeding by generalisation, politi-
cians and several media or individual journalists alleged without
any substantial evidence that the 2007 fires were a Turkish plot
against Greece.27 Among them, two members of the government
at the time, Vyron Polydoras (Minister of Public Order, 2006-
2007)28 and Thodoris Roussopoulos (Minister and spokesperson
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26. Yilmaz’ statement was part of an interview for the Turkish news-
paper BirGün published on 23 December 2011. The following day, Yilmaz
claimed that he was misquoted, and that he only spoke of arsons by Greek
agents at the Turkish coast. The issue prompted political and media reac-
tions in both Greece and Turkey. See: ‘Mesut Yilmaz karanlik yillari birgün’e
anlatt: Yunanistan’da orman yakmak devlet sirriydi’, BirGün, 23 Decem-
ber 2011; ‘Outrage as former Turkish prime minister says the country se-
cretly started huge forest fires in Greece’, Business Insider, 28 December
2011, http://www.businessinsider.com/turkey-greece-yilmaz-2011-12 (re-
trieved 2 August 2017); ‘Yilmaz denies fire remarks that caused outrage in
Greece’, Today’s Zaman, 27 December 2011, http://www.todayszaman.
com/diplomacy_yilmaz-denies-fire-remarks-that-caused-outrage-in-greece_
266929.html (retrieved 3 June 2016); Orhan Kemal Cengiz, ‘Turkish deep
state and Greek forest fires’, Today’s Zaman, 27 December 2011, http://
www.todayszaman.com/columnist/orhan-kemal-cengiz/turkish-deep-state-
and-greek-forest-fires_266931.html (retrieved 3 June 2016); ‘Former Turkish
PM’s arson admission fuels anger’, eKathimerini, 26 November 2011, http://
www.ekathimerini.com/137956/article/ekathimerini/news/former-turkish-pms-
arson-admission-fuels-anger (retrieved 5 August 2017)
27. Former Head of the Greek Intelligence (1993-1996), Leonidas Vasi-
likopoulos, made clear in an interview that suspicions for the potential in-
volvement of Turkish agents only concerned cases of arson on the coasts
of Aegean islands and not in other parts of Greece. He also said that one
should be cautious regarding the motives of Yilmaz’ revelations in that par-
ticular timing; V. Lampropoulos, ‘Ναι, ξέραµε για τους Τούρκους εµρη -
στές’, Το Βήµα, 28 December 2011; http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?
aid=436556 (retrieved 30 July 2017)
28. ‘Ήθελαν να “κάψουν” και τον Καραµανλή το 2007 στην Ηλεία’,
‘Ιδού οι ράκτορες της ΜΙΤ και οι Γκρίζοι Λύκοι ου έβαζαν ϕωτιά στα
δάση µας’, Κυριακάτικη ∆ηµοκρατία, 1 January 2012, http://news247.gr/ei-
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of the New Democracy government, 2004-2008), both mentioning
Yilmaz’ statement.29
On the political level, such allegations about the supposed ar-
sonists served to hide domestic responsibilities and shortcomings
of the Greek authorities as far as civil and environmental protec-
tion is concerned. Even if only a part of the public is convinced,
these theories contribute to maintaining prejudice and negative
stereotypes against neighbouring nations, and foster the phobic
impression that Greece is surrounded by enemies who are per-
manently plotting its destruction. As Umberto Eco rightfully
notes (2012: 100), ‘People only believe what they already know,
and this is the beauty of  the Universal Form of  Conspiracy.’
It is interesting to see an example of how a conspiracy theo-
ry was introduced by the media, specifically how an allegation
based on pure speculation was presented as a mere fact: On 3
April 2014, an article with the title: ‘Revelation: Turkish agents
put the fires in 2007 in Elis’ was published by the newspaper
Parapolitika.30 The name of the newspaper, Parapolitika, is it-
self interesting, since it refers to political gossip and backroom
politics. In the introduction, the report affirms with the same
certainty that the journalist Michalis Ignatiou (who was a well-
known correspondent of important Greek media in the US and
was regarded as a ‘serious’ journalist, although he was often ex-
pressing nationalist views) ‘revealed’ that the 2007 fires were set
by Turkish agents. 
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diseis/poludwras-hthelan-na-kapsoyn-ton-karamanlh-to-2007.1557862.html
(retrieved 31 July 2017) 
29. ‘Βόµβα Ρουσόουλου: Οργανωµένο σχέδιο των Τούρκων οι υρ-
καγιές του 2007’, Το Ποντίκι, 19 March 2017, http://www.topontiki.gr/ar-
ticle/212739/vomva-roysopoyloy-organomeno-shedio-ton-toyrkon-oi-pyrka-
gies-toy-2007 (retrieved 30 July 2017)
30. http://www.parapolitika.gr/article/73509/apokalypsi-toyrkoi-prak-
tores-evalan-tis-foties-2007-stin-ileia (retrieved 3 June 2016); Elis is a de-
partment in the Western Peloponnese, where Ancient Olympia is located.
The same news story, based on Ignatiou’s article, was reproduced in many
other news portals.
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The newspaper left no doubt that the so-called ‘revelation’ of
Ignatiou was based on facts. However, when one sees Ignatiou’s
statement as quoted a few lines below, it becomes clear that the
journalist was just speculating: he first mentions some illegal
recordings that were leaked in Turkey, according to which the
Turkish government was planning a ‘provocation’ in Syria. Without
any apparent connexion, Ignatiou then claims that ‘it is not the
first time that the politico-military establishment of  Turkey
planned illegal and criminal actions against Greece and Cyprus.
It’s no secret that for many years the successive Greek govern-
ments knew that the wildfires, which usually started in many
parts of  Greece in the beginning of  the tourist season, were the
work of  Turkish agents. Following discussions with political and
military factors in Greece, I am convinced that especially the fires
of  2007 were put according to a plan by Ankara.’
The claim is not substantiated by any solid argument or
proof, other than the above-mentioned ‘discussions’. Ignatiou
says he is ‘convinced’, which is subjective enough. And while it
cannot be judged as professional for a journalist to spread alle-
gations that are not crosschecked and verified, the newspaper
adds to the abuse by presenting the whole story as the ‘revela-
tion’ of some hidden but absolute truth. 
Interestingly, Ignatiou continued by mentioning as relevant
to his claim, that ‘the events of 1964’ in Cyprus were equally a
Turkish provocation, which was allegedly presented ‘by Greek-
speaking agents of Turkey’ as being perpetrated by ‘Greek-Cypri-
ot fanatics’. ‘Only few years ago we learned the truth’, he con-
cluded. One of the typical features of conspiracy theories is to
jump from one case to the other, producing a kind of ‘associa-
tion’ that is supposed to strengthen the point one wants to make,
without giving any details or proofs. Ignatiou concluded his re-
marks with more alarmist statements against Turkey, which was
from the very beginning the ‘culprit’ he was searching to de-
nounce on all possible grounds.
To sum up: even if some or even all the claims mentioned
above were true, what makes them fit into the conspiracy theo-
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ry pattern is their discursive construction: the fascination for the
‘hidden truth’ and the motto of ‘revelation’, the fact that nega-
tive developments are attributed to a sinister plan, the denunci-
ation of a ‘guilty party’ (responsible for the ‘plot’) and the alar -
mist statements against it, as well as a series of logical fallacies:
allegations lacking argumentation and evidence, semi-truths
combined with speculations, and assertions based on correla-
tions, arbitrary conclusions, and on the selective reference to
comparable cases. In Eco’s words (2012: 99): ‘Here’s a form to be
filled out at will, by each person with their own conspiracy.’
b) The assassination plot against former PM Karamanlis
A few years later, it was ‘revealed’ that another alleged conspir-
acy occurred during the government of New Democracy: specifi -
cally, an assassination plot against Prime Minister Kostas Kara-
manlis.31 The report on the issue appeared in June 2011 in the
news-magazine Epikaira, which was often publishing so-called
‘revelations’ about economic scandals, geo-political analyses, mili -
tary issues and, of course, conspiracies. 
The story goes as follows: in February 2009 the National In-
telligence Service (EYP) had produced a confidential report, ac-
cording to which it had received information from a Russian of-
ficial who was based in Greece and was connected to the Rus -
sian Federal Security Service (FSB, the successor of KGB), about
an assassination plot against PM Karamanlis, back in 2008. The
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31. Kostas (Konstantinos) Karamanlis (born in 1956) was Prime Mini -
ster from 2004 to 2009. He was elected as President of the conservative New
Democracy party in 1997, mainly because he was the nephew of the for-
mer President of the Republic and founder of New Democracy Konstan-
tinos Karamanlis (1907-1998). Politically moderate, he encouraged a centrist
realignment of the party, willing to attract the voters of what he coined as
the ‘middle-space’ of the political spectrum. In many cases, however, no-
tably on issues related to the national identity, the Church, the Cyprus is-
sue and the Macedonian dispute, he embraced conservative, so-called ‘pa-
triotic’ views, in line with the traditional rhetoric of the party.
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Greek report (based on the Russian report) claimed that Russian
agents had come to Greece for counter-espionage, because Kara-
manlis, along with the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the
Bulgarian PM Parvanov were victims of wiretapping. It also
claimed that the Russian report mentioned that Karamanlis was
targeted by Western and Israeli secret services, which were op-
posed to his agreement with Russia for the construction of the
Burgas-Alexandroupolis and the ‘South Stream’ pipelines.32 Al-
legedly, the Russian agents even claimed that in April 2008,
while following the car of Karamanlis close to his house in Ra-
fina, they came across another car with US agents who were plan-
ning his assassination, and the two teams exchanged fire, but
eventually the latter managed to escape. The Greek authorities
gave to the plot the code name ‘Pythia 1’, from the famous ora-
cle of Delphi in Ancient Greece. 
The reception of the news about the plot against Karaman-
lis was mixed. Many in the media expressed scepticism and even
scorn: two years after his fall from power (in the elections of Oc-
tober 2009), it seemed as if some were trying to present the (of-
ten described as ‘idle’) former PM Karamanlis as a hero; he had
supposedly resisted the US supremacy in order to align Greece
with Russia, which by a growing number of nationalist Greeks
was seen as a powerful, orthodox and traditional ally. According
to some analysts, the supporters of Karamanlis inside the party
were trying to prepare the way for his come-back. 
In July 2011, the report of the Greek Intelligence Service
was leaked to the press. The Greek intelligence seemed to har-
bour some doubt about the credibility of the Russian report, and
did not exclude that the alleged plot might be an attempt at ‘disin -
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32. Conspiracist claims about a US reaction to the pipeline agreement
with Russia were already voiced in the press in 2007, presented as a mo-
tive for the alleged arsons’ ‘attack’ against Greece. Avriani (Sunday 2 Sep-
tember 2007) had even a headline with the following rhetorical question:
‘Who are seeking to shape developments [leading] to a powerless Greece,
absent from the Balkans and particularly without special relations with
Russia?’ (Iliadeli 2010: 69).
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formation against the Greek authorities, aiming at serving speci -
fic objectives’.33 Even the newspaper Demokratia, which is close
to the New Democracy party, reminded that the media ought to
maintain a ‘significant distance from sources of  secret services,
which do not have a reputation of  being transparent’.34 Other
media also published unofficial statements of Greek intelligence
officers who said that the ‘Russian’ account was not convincing.35
Interestingly, in 2013 a magazine known for its propensity
for conspiracy theories titled Hot Doc published an extended re-
port which ‘revealed’ the conspiracy of the conspiracy: how and
by whom the alleged assassination plot was set up.36 According
to it, a team of Greek agents had fabricated the story in order to
abuse state funds. The magazine was accusing the same team for
being responsible for many other manipulations, related to both
internal and foreign affairs.
All the same, others were absolutely convinced that Kara-
manlis had been targeted. The reception of the story depended
in large part on political affiliation, as well as on pre-existing
stereotypes, namely against the US and/or pro-Russian. In most
cases, the right-wing media reproduced the news without ques-
tioning anything, underscoring the courageous policy of the for-
mer PM who allegedly had risked his life. 
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33. St. Chios, ‘Η έκθεση των Ρώσων για το σχέδιο δολοϕονίας του Κώ -
στα Καραµανλή’, ∆ηµοκρατία, 28 July 2011, http://www.dimokratianews.
gr/content/1497/%CE%B7-%CE%AD%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE
%B7-%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD-%CF%81%CF%8E%CF%83%CF%89%CE%BD-
%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%83%CF%87%CE%AD%CE
%B4%CE%B9%CE%BF-%CE%B4%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%86%CE%
BF%CE%BD%CE%AF%CE%B1%CF%82-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CE%BA
%CF%8E%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B1-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%81%CE%B1% CE
%BC%CE% B1%CE%BD%CE%BB%CE%AE (retrieved 10 August 2017) 
34. Ibid.
35. V. Lampropoulos, ‘Το άγνωστο αρασκήνιο της “αόειρας δολο -
ϕονίας” του Κώστα Καραµανλή’, Το Βήµα, 15 March 2012, online: http://
www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=448608 (retrieved 7 August 2017) 
36. ‘Ποιοι έστησαν το ψεύτικο σχέδιο δολοϕονίας του Καραµανλή’, Hot
Doc, n. 27, May 2013.
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The conspiracy theory was further developed to explain the
fact that Karamanlis was not eventually assassinated: once in-
formed by the Russians, his security elaborated a safety plan; the
former PM was changing itineraries constantly and was under
strict protection. In December 2011, journalist and press editor
G. Trangas (well-known for his sensationalist, populist and often
vulgar mode of expression) published a special report on the is-
sue, ‘revealing’ that the former PM had lived as a ‘hostage’ for
242 days.37 Afraid for his life and totally restricted in his move-
ments, he was allegedly forced to abandon his position, so he pro -
claimed the early elections of 2009, which he deliberately lost.38
Thus, this version of the conspiracy theory claims that the fall of
Karamanlis’ government was due – not to its failure in the politi -
cal and economic field – but to an American plot against him.39
Additionally, several scandals that had marred the New De -
mocracy mandate (namely the Vatopedi and Zachopoulos affairs)
were also attributed to the conspiracy, which supposedly aimed
at destabilising Greece. Eventually, the 2007 wildfires,40 as well
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37. ‘242 ηµέρες οµηρείας Καραµανλή. Έζησα σε καραντίνα µέχρι το
βράδυ των εκλογών’, Crash, 9, December 2011, http://www.crashonline.gr/
%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%8D%CF%87%CE%BF%CF%82-9%CE%B4%CE%B5%
CE%BA%CE%AD%CE%BC%CE%B2%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%82-2011/
(retrieved 10 August 2017). According to Trangas, his sources were the per-
sonal diary of Karamanlis and people close to him.
38. ‘∆ύο νέες “σκιές” για το σχέδιο δολοϕονίας Καραµανλή’, Παρα-
πολιτικά, 26 February 2015, http://www.parapolitika.gr/index.php/article/
duo-nees-skies-gia-to-sxedio-dolofonias-karamanli (retrieved 10 August
2017).
39. Earlier the same year, Trangas had interviewed Karamanlis; the
former PM spoke about the US reactions to his agreements with Russia, for
which Putin had warned him, insinuating that he faced the consequences.
‘Πώς είδα τον Καραµανλή σε ένα δίωρο τετ-α-τετ’, Crash, 2, February
2011, http://www.crashonline.gr/%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%8D%CF%87%CE%BF%
CF%82-2-%CF%86%CE%B5%CE%B2%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%AC%CF%
81%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%82-2011/ (retrieved 30 September 2017)
40. In February 2017, two retired Fire Brigade officers published a book
presenting the 2007 wildfires as part of the broader plot by foreign agents
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as another important case, the wiretapping operation against the
PM and members of the government in 2004-2005 (which ac-
cording to credible evidence was undertaken by the US)41 were
considered as part of the same plot. 
Following the underlying logic of the conspiracy mentality
implying that ‘everything is connected’, some eventually in-
cluded in the same conspiracy theory the 2008 riots in Athens,
which were prompted by the assassination of a 15-year old stu-
dent by a police officer. Among them were the former Parlia-
ment Speaker (elected with SYRIZA) Zoe Konstantopoulou42 and
the current Minister of Defence Panos Kammenos (ANEL), who
at the time was member of the government of New Democra-
cy.43 According to this view, the 2008 riots were instigated by
foreign (i.e. US) agents, in order to spread chaos in Greece and
to overthrow the government. The fact that politicians with op-
posite political affiliations were supporting such claims indicates
the penetration of the conspiracy mentality in the political main-
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to undermine the Greek government. Former PM Karamanlis, along with
three of his former ministers, attended the book launch event. Ιωάννης Στα -
µούλης, Νικόλαος ∆ιαµαντής, Οι ασύµµετρες πυρκαγιές του 2007 στην
Ελλάδα, Αθήνα: Αλεξίυρο, 2017. See: http://www.thetoc.gr/koinwnia/ar-
ticle/epanerxontai-oi-thewries-sunwmosias-gia-tis-purkagies-tou-2007 (re-
trieved 10 July 2017). For a critical response by other Fire Brigade officers:
http://www.tovima.gr/society/article/?aid=863483 (retrieved 10 July 2017).
41. Ch. Zervas, ‘Η Vodafone έδειξε την αµερικανική ρεσβεία’, Κυ-
ριακάτικη Ελευθεροτυπία, 4 September 2011, http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.
el.article&id=306783 (retrieved 10 August 2017).
42. ‘Ποινική δίωξη για σχέδιο δολοϕονίας Καραµανλή’, Σκάι, 15 Mar -
ch 2012, http://www.skai.gr/news/politics/article/197646/poiniki-dioxi-gia-she -
dio-dolofonias-tou-karamanli-/ (retrieved 10 August 2017).
43. ‘Καµµένος: Υήρχε σχέδιο δολοϕονίας του Καραµανλή’, enikos.gr,
30 October 2014, http://www.enikos.gr/politics/273923/kammenos-ypirxe-
sxedio-dolofonias-tou-karamanli (retrieved 10 August 2017); ‘Καµµένος: Η
ολιτική Καραµανλή µε τη Ρωσία έριξε την κυβέρνησή του’, Πρώτο Θέµα,
30 October 2014, http://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/422402/kam-
menos-i-politiki-karamanli-me-ti-rosia-erixe-tin-kuvernisi-tou-/ (retrieved
30 September 2017).
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stream, especially among those using a pronounced populist
rhetoric.44
A similar trend can be discerned in the media: the populist
or ‘yellow’ press and those individual journalists who have a po -
pulist approach were often publishing conspiracy narratives.
Among them, the press specialised in sensational ‘revelations’
and political scandals had the strongest predilection for conspi -
racism. Other types of media that systematically promoted con-
spiracy theories were newspapers, magazines or news portals de-
voted to defence or nationalist issues.45
Generally, the political orientation of each news media de-
termined which type of conspiracy theory it would opt for. In
cases of conspiracy narratives advanced by political leaders, par-
tisanship was a decisive factor for their reception and coverage.
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44. A recent empirical research (Van Prooijen et. al. 2015) has demon-
strated a correlation between conspiracy theories and political extremism
(both left and right). The authors argue that ‘political extremism and conspi -
racy beliefs are strongly associated due to a highly structured thinking
style that is aimed at making sense of societal events’. However, ‘extre -
mism’ is ill-defined in the study, which is based on participants’ self-classi -
fication. Additionally, one could object that, as far as the political discourse
is concerned, a) not all extreme or radical left groups or members support
conspiracy theories; and b) many politicians and followers of non-extreme
parties, also advocate conspiracy theories (as can be seen in the case of
Greece). Populism, with its underlying logic of dichotomy between the peo -
ple (as an undifferentiated entity) and its (powerful) opponents is more li -
kely to facilitate conspiracy thinking (Taggart 2000: 105).
45. We are referring here on one hand, to newspapers of the ultra-
nationalist and far-right milieu (Eleftheri Ora, Stochos, Chryssi Avghi etc.)
and on the other, to magazines of broader audience, combining a nationa -
list and populist approach, such as Epikaira, Crash, Pro News, which pro -
pagated the conspiracy theory about Karamanlis’ assassination plot, based
on leaks from his environment and the secret services. Many more news por -
tals and blogs with nationalist content were regularly publishing reports on
this topic and other alleged conspiracies, often copying one another. The
same media mentioned above were among those denouncing the EU respon -
se to the Greek financial crisis and regularly published conspiracist inter-
pretations of the crisis and international relations.
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Yet, few newspapers dared contradict or challenge a theory en-
dorsed by official sources, such as the one examined here. In
most cases, the news reports were factual, without comments or
counter-arguments, but, more often than not, with a sensational
title, taking the conspiracy for granted. The attribution of blame
to foreign powers on an issue that had to do with national secu-
rity and sovereignty seemed to discourage critical inquiries by
the press and even to put off partisan debate.46
Since 2011, the ‘assassination plot’ against Karamanlis has
been investigated by the judiciary. The judges who are running
the investigation seem not to question the reliability of the story.
In 2013, the file on the wiretapping scandal was unified with the
one on the assassination plot. However, while for the wiretapping
case charges were filed against a Greek-American agent of the
CIA, based on strong evidence, for the assassination plot there was
nothing but contrasting allegations by Greek and foreign mem-
bers of Security Services. Eventually, in September 2017, the
Court closed the case, since no suspects had been identified.47
Nevertheless, for those in the wider public who are fasci-
nated by conspiracies, the assassination plot against former PM
Karamanlis is more than certain; it should have been expected.
It corresponds to the dominant perception of the role of the CIA,
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46. For a discussion of the journalists’ tendency to adopt the govern-
ment / state positions on issues of national importance, due to the dominant
ethnocentric bias, in order to meet the expectations of the public, or due
to their dependence from the official sources of information, see: Skou la -
riki 2005: 237-250, 439-446; Skoulariki 2007b: 76-87.
47. P. Stathis, ‘Σχέδιο “Πυθία”: Το δικαστικό αϕήγηµα για την
“τώση” της κυβέρνησης Καραµανλή’, capital.gr, 19 September 2017,
http://www.capital.gr/epikairotita/3240873/sxedio-puthia-to-dikastiko-afigi-
ma-gia-tin-ptosi-tis-kubernisis-karamanli (retrieved 20 September 2017).
Despite the decision of the judiciary, the magazine Pro News published an
extensive report on the ‘great conspiracy’, assuming that the main suspect
for the wiretapping operation (W. Basil) was also the one who had been
planning Karamanlis’ assassination; Y. Petridis, ‘Σχέδιο δολοϕονίας Κώστα
Καραµανλή. Τα άγνωστα στοιχεία και τα ρόσωα της µεγάλης συνω-
µοσίας’, Pro News, no 17, October 2017, pp. 6-15.
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its clandestine operations against hostile foreign leaders, and its
tradition of overthrowing democratic governments in third-world
countries. According to this view, Karamanlis paid for the
pipeline agreement with Russia, for the fact that (practically) he
did not support the Annan plan for the re-unification of Cyprus
(against the will of the US and the UK), and for his decision to ve-
to the accession of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
to NATO in 2008 at the Summit of Bucharest (a move that indeed
infuriated the US administration).48
While the reasons invoked to explain the discontent of the
US with Karamanlis might be plausible (although the general
orientation of the ND government was clearly backed by the US),
the idea that this discontent could justify a plot for the elimina-
tion of the Greek leader by the American secret services seems
rather extreme. Those who support this conspiracy theory tend
to analyse in a seemingly rational way the first (the reasons of the
American discontent), but proceed by a logical gap to the second
(the assumption of the assassination plot). They also neglect to
critically examine the plausibility of the alleged plot in its de-
tails, to question the credibility of the available sources of in-
formation about it, and to challenge the motives for such a ‘reve -
lation’. 
Interestingly, while the US is regarded with extreme suspi-
cion by those who endorse the assassination plot theory, no cau-
tion whatsoever is demonstrated vis-à-vis the intentions of the
Russian state and its agents. This pro-Russian bias is the latest
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48. ‘Ο Κώστας Καραµανλής σάει τη σιωή του’, 6 meres, 13 April
2013; quoted in: News 247, 13 April 2013; http://news247.gr/eidiseis/politi-
ki/kwstas-karamanlhs-polu-travhgmeno-to-senario-dolofonias-moy.2208756.
html According to anonymous sources from his environment, Karamanlis
hi mself did not believe in the assassination plot. However, he never voiced
openly any disagreement with the media reports on the issue, nor with the
judicial investigation. Additionally, this report contrasts with previous ac-
counts based on G. Trangas’ interviews with Karamanlis and his close asso -
ciates, where the former PM seemed to support the assassination theory;
see the footnotes 37 and 39.
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manifestation of traditional Greek Russophilia, in combination
with a widespread prejudice against the US (Lialiouti 2016), es-
pecially regarding its foreign policy and interventionism around
the world.
Conspiracy-oriented analyses of  the Greek crisis
It is worth noting that the narrative about the alleged conspiracy
against Karamanlis and his government was developed while
Greece was plunging into the economic crisis. The shocking and
unexpected collapse of the national economy in 2009-2010, fol-
lowed by the bailout agreements with the European Commission,
the European Central Bank and the IMF (the infamous ‘troika’),
by several years of political instability, austerity policies, and by
the degradation of living standards for the vast majority of the
population, led to widespread disillusionment and to the redefi-
nition of the self-image of Greeks, who oscillated between per-
ceptions of guilt and victimisation (Bithymitris & Lialiouti 2017).
In this context of fear, anger and political polarisation, conspi -
racy theories came to dominate public discourse.49 Large sections
of the population, from the right and the left equally,50 attributed
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49. Hofstadter (1996 [1965]: 39) notes that ‘the paranoid disposition
is mobilized into action chiefly by social conflicts that involve ultimate sche -
mes of values and that bring fundamental fears and hatreds, rather than
negotiable interests, into political action. Catastrophe or the fear of cata-
strophe is most likely to elicit the syndrome of paranoid rhetoric’.
50. After the crisis, the political distinction between right and left was
blurred by another major dividing line: the support or the opposition to
the austerity policy and the implementation of the Memorandum of Under -
standing that accompanied the bailout agreements with the ‘troika’. The
ruling political parties since 1974, centre-left PASOK (in power in 2009-
2011) and conservative New Democracy (shifting from an initial opposition
to the Memorandum to the support of the reforms, after joining a coalition
government in November 2011), along with smaller liberal parties, promo -
ted a narrative of collective guilt for the crisis, blaming the clientelist poli -
tical system, the lack of meritocracy, the generalised tax evasion, and the
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the crisis itself to an external machination: not to domestic and
international financial politics, failed Eurozone po licies or the
power of the markets, but to a deliberate plot by ‘foreign powers’
to destroy Greece – allegedly for being too independent, or as a
means to depreciate Greek assets and resources (and thus profit
from their acquisition), and/or in order to use the Greek bank-
ruptcy as a case in point, to prevent other nations from defying
the austerity doctrine. 
Germany in particular was seen as the main instigator of an
austerity policy that aimed at the “subordination” of Greece and
the European South, as a means to affirm its hegemony in the
EU.51 In 2013, Professor Nikos Kotzias, later to become the Mini -
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pressure of ‘populist’ demands. Opposed to the reforms, and rejecting the
‘anti-populist’ discourse, were the Communist Party (KKE), the Coalition
of the Radical Left (SYRIZA), the far-right Independent Greeks (ANEL, foun -
ded in 2012) and the neo-nazi Golden Dawn. These parties, despite their
significant differences in most other aspects, formed a eurosceptic block
that rejected neo-liberalism, and more or less blamed the international fi-
nancial system, the inequalities inside the Eurozone and Germany’s aus-
terity doctrine for the crisis in Greece and the European South. Public de-
bate was eventually marked by the polarisation between the two antagonistic
discourses and the reciprocal accusations for ‘populist’ and ‘anti-populist’
demagogy (Sevastakis, Stavrakakis 2012, Stavrakakis et al. 2017, Vamvakas
2014: 9-41). On this basis, in January 2015, SYRIZA, having won a 36,3%
of the votes, formed a coalition government with the smaller ANEL poli -
tical party (4,75%); after the failure of negotiations for the revision of the
bailout terms, and in spite of having organised a referendum in July 2015,
in which 61,3% of the voters rejected the proposed Memorandum, Alexis
Tsipras’ government, with the support of the ANEL, started implementing the
reforms requested by the former ‘troika’, henceforth called ‘the Institu-
tions’. Accusing SYRIZA of having ‘capitulated’, several MPs and party mem -
bers left to form their own radical left, anti-euro, political parties, name-
ly former Minister Panayotis Lafazanis and former Parliament Speaker Zoe
Konstantopoulou, without succeeding to be elected. 
51. In an opinion article published on the website of the national
news agency, journalist Dimitris Konstantakopoulos wrote about a ‘faustian
coalition’ between Merkel’s Germany and ‘the most extreme powers of glo -
bal finance’, which incited ‘the markets to attack Greece’, thus gaining
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ster of Foreign Affairs of the SYRIZA governments (2015-to this
day), affirmed in his book entitled Debt colony: ‘Germany is
showing a neo-colonial imperial attitude towards Greece […]. A
policy of  “discipline” and “punishment”.’.52 The expression ‘debt
colony’ was one of the slogans of left-wing criticism against the
austerity policy imposed by the troika, and was also used by the
future PM Alexis Tsipras, when SYRIZA was in the opposition.53
In this context, the references to a ‘new German occupation’
and to a (supposed) ‘Fourth Reich’54 were frequent, while Chan-
cellor Merkel and the German MFA Schäuble were often depict-
ed with nazi uniforms in political satire or in protest signs. The
MP of Independent Greeks Vassilis Kapernaros affirmed in 2013:
‘While the assassins are plunging the well-known European states
in misery, […] the Germans of  the IVth Reich, the instigators of
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‘the weapon’ Germany needed in order to discipline the EU; ‘Το νέο “γερ -
µανικό ζήτηµα”’, ΑΜΕ/ΜΠΕ, 17 August 2015, http://www.amna.gr/article-
featured.php?id=85514 (retrieved 10 August 2017). In 2011, G. Trangas was
writing in his magazine’s editorial: ‘Does anybody still has doubts that
what we are living, what we are going through eleven million laboratory
animals in the Balkan South aren’t but the (first) phases of a well-plan -
ned, premeditated crime?’; ‘Ποιος θα ει “άι σιχτίρ”;’, Crash, 8, Novem -
ber 2011, p. 3, http://www.crashonline.gr/%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%8D%CF%
87%CE%BF%CF%82-8%CE%BD%CE%BF%CE%AD%CE%BC%CE%B2%CF%
81%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%82-2011/ (retrieved 10 August 2017)
52. N. Kotzias (2013). Ελλάδα αποικία χρέους. Ευρωπαϊκή αυτοκρα-
τορία και γερµανική πρωτοκαθεδρία. Athens: Patakis.
53. ‘Τσίρας: Όχι σε µια αοικία χρέους’, enikos.gr, 24 October 2012,
http://www.enikos.gr/politics/90986/tsipras-oxi-se-mia-apoikia-xreous (re-
trieved: 9 August 2017); ‘Α. Τσίρας: Αοικία χρέους και νεότωχων η
Ελλάδα της τρικοµµατικής’, Αυγή, 28 April 2013, http://www.avgi.gr/arti-
cle/10842/249027/a-tsipras-apoikia-chreous-kai-neoptochon-e-ellada-tes-tri -
kommatikes-binteo- (retrieved 9 August 2017).
54. Apart from many references in the press, see the statement of the
MP of Independent Greeks, Terens Quick: ‘Ο Κουίκ για τη Μέρκελ: Να
αοκαλούµε τη Γερµανία ∆΄ Ράιχ’, enikos.gr, 18 July 2014, http://www. eni -
kos.gr/politics/251578/o-kouik-gia-ti-merkel-na-apokaloume-ti-germania-
d-raix (retrieved 10 August 2017).
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 23:36:34 |
all the pre-arranged plans for the economic catastrophe of  most
European states, are treasuring up’.55
The media56 were particularly prone to reproduce schematic,
controversial and sensational statements, which attract the au-
dience and prompt debate. Besides, the ethnocentric bias is
deeply inscribed in most people’s mentality. In TV news, the
framing of foreign officials’ interventions and statements was
rarely positive, reflecting the distrust of Greek journalists and
commentators (Poulakidakos 2014: 131-132).57 A research on
Greek news portals’ coverage of the crisis stressed that most ti-
tles were echoing ‘the feeling of  injustice and of  the disposition
of  the foreigners to accuse, to “sabotage” Greece or to use it as a
sacrificial lamb’ (Zarali and Frangonikolopoulos 2013: 284-285). 
At the same time, according to a poll,58 1/3 of the population
(33%) believed that Greeks were victims of chemtrails, which al-
legedly serve to make people passive and submissive.59 To quote
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55. ‘Καερνάρος: Θησαυρίζουν οι Γερµανοί του ∆ ΄ Ράιχ!’, paraski -
nio.gr, 1 April 2013, http://www.paraskhnio.gr/kapernaros-thisayrizoyn-oi-
germanoi/ (retrieved 10 August 2017).
56. For the consequences of the crisis on the media landscape and on
the quality and ethics of journalism in Greece, see: Pleios 2013; Komninou
2017.
57. Poulakidakos (2014: 146) did not find conspiracist comments (con-
trary to one of his research hypotheses), but his corpus consisted exclusi -
vely of TV news reports concerning statements of foreign political actors
and institutions. He notes however that instead of advancing a conspiracy
theory involving some ‘obscure decision-making centre’, commentators di -
rectly accused specific foreign leaders for the economic disaster in Greece.
58. Opinion Poll by Metron Analysis conducted in September 2013;
‘Είσηµο: Το 33% των Ελλήνων ιστεύει ότι µας ψεκάζουν’, Lifo, 13 Oc-
tober 2013, http://www.lifo.gr/team/bitsandpieces/42567 (retrieved 10 Au-
gust 2017).
59. Social anthropologist Alexandra Bakalaki (2014, 2016) made an in-
teresting parallel between the chemtrails narratives and the discourse on
the Greek crisis and its causes. However, she does not analyse the chemtrails
theme from the scope of conspiracy theory, partly because, according to one
version, the alleged damage to the environment and humans is unintentio -
nal, a mere consequence of programs developed in order to fight the cli-
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the headline of the far-right newspaper Eleftheri Ora, ‘It’s not
our fault. They spray us with gaz that makes us dump’.60 In Oc-
tober 2011, two MPs of the populist and nationalist party LAOS
(People), addressed a question about the chemtrails to the gov-
ernment.
The idea that Greeks have a tradition of resistance against
tyranny and occupation is a widespread national stereotype.
Thus, despite a series of massive protests in 2010-2012, culmi-
nating at the movement of the Greek ‘indignants’ (Georgiadou
et al. 2017), the fact that the majority of the citizens suffered
from the austerity policies imposed by the foreign creditors with-
out recourse to a popular uprising, seemed inexplicable to those
who were convinced that Greeks had an inherently ‘resistant
character’,61 or even – as the expression goes – a ‘resistant
DNA’.62 Under the shock of the financial crisis and the collapse
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mate change that went wrong. Even so, the ideas a) that public health is
endangered by large scale use of experimental technology, and b) that the
authorities are hiding the truth, are typical of conspiracist thinking. Even
more fitting to the conspiracy theory pattern is the other, predominant ver-
sion of chemtrails fear, according to which powerful elites (often related
to the New World Order) are intentionally spraying with dangerous che -
mical substances the world population – and in this case, especially the
Greeks – in order to impose their political agenda without resistance.
60. ‘∆εν ϕταίµε εµείς. Μας ψεκάζουν µε ηλιθιογόνα αέρια’, Ελεύθε-
ρη Ώρα, 23 October 2010.
61. For a critical discussion of the ‘resistant character of the Greek
people’, see: Akis Gavriilidis, ‘Ο διαϕοριστικός ρατσισµός του Νίκου Σβο-
ρώνου’, Θέσεις, 91, April-June 2005, http://www.conspiracywatch.info/L-al-
liance-Syriza-Grecsindependants-le-facteur-complotiste_a1356.html (re-
trieved 3 June 2016); Pantazopoulos 2015: 9-22.
62. See e.g.: D. Konstantakopoulos, ‘Η αγίδα κλείνει’, Το Παρόν
της Κυριακής, 25 March 2016, http://www.konstantakopoulos.gr/2016/03/
25/%CE%B7-%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%B3%CE%AF%CE%B4%CE%B1-%CE%BA%
CE%BB%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%B9/ (retrieved 9 June 2016);
G. Papasimos, ‘Μνηµονιακός “ανθελληνισµός” και ολιτικός “κατήϕορος”’,
1 June 2013, https://pratto.gr/2013/06/01/%CE%BC%CE%BD% CE% B7% CE%
BC%CE%BF%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%B1%CE%BA%CE%BF%CF%83-%CE%B1
%CE% BD%CE%B8%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%BB%CE%B7%CE%BD%CE%B9%
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of their way of life, facing long-term insecurity and the conse-
quences of a failing state, Greeks searched for hidden explana-
tions and malign designs.
In all cases, Greece was seen as the victim of foreign machi-
nations, while the main culprits were conveniently picked from
the reservoir of the historical enemies of the nation: Turks and
Albanians on the regional scale, the US and (lately) Germany on
the global one. As Bithymitris and Lialiouti state (2017: 56), ‘the
anti-German discourse became a vehicle for anti-capitalist and
anti-globalization rhetoric’, similar to the anti-American dis-
course of the post-dictatorship period (Lialiouti 2016).
It should be pointed out, though, that the perception of Ger-
many as a threatening hegemonic power is new and subsequent
to the crisis. The Second World War trauma was reactivated af-
ter many decades of peaceful relations not only on state-level,
but also on the societal one, given the emigration of large num-
bers of Greeks to Germany in the 1960-70s and German mass
tourism in Greece every summer.
Despite the predominance of a common conspiracist ap-
proach in both right-wing and left-wing discourses on the crisis
(mostly among those who had a critical stance towards the neo-
liberal doctrine), political and ideological differences did affect
the basic narrative-line and the attribution of blame. 
On one side, while mainstream left criticism opted for an in-
stitutional analysis of the globalised post-capitalist economy and
of international financial interests, part of the radical left used a
binary, conspiracist rhetoric, blaming the hegemonic financial
politics of Germany, the US and the IMF for having intentionally
caused the collapse of Greek socio-economic conditions.
On the other side, the extreme-right variant of the conspir-
acy theory concerning the Greek crisis included references to
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%BF%CE%BB/ (retrieved 9 June 2016). In this last text, the author refers spe -
cifically to ‘the heroic moments in the historic trajectory of a People that
fun ction as its istoric resistant DNA’.
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the Jews and ‘Zionism’, to international bankers and other mag-
nates, to the New World Order, and insisted not only on finan-
cial, but also on security risks for the country. This rhetoric, de-
spite its nationalist overtones, is in fact a Greek version of the
old-new conspiracy theory imported from the US referring to in-
ternational capitalism and the threat of ‘global governance’
(Barkun: 39-40, 62-64). The increasingly informal communica-
tion through the web, (semi-)private blogs and the social media
helped diffuse this type of discourse among the Greek public. 
The above-mentioned variant of conspiracist rhetoric con-
cerning the Greek crisis was shared by political parties, namely
the ultra-nationalist Golden Dawn and the Independent Greeks
(ANEL), the right-wing, nationalist and populist party launched
in February 2012 by Panos Kammenos, which eventually formed
a coalition government with SYRIZA in January 2015.63 Kam-
menos and his party argued that Greece was ‘under occupation’,
that the country was the victim of a conspiracy and that the ‘New
World Order’ and the ‘Supranational Elite’ were plotting to es-
tablish a ‘Global Financial Power’. In a speech in 2012, Kam-
menos even named ‘the Bilderberg Group’, ‘George Sorros’ and
‘the members of  the different [Masonic] lodges’ as the ones who
‘speculate at the expense of  the country by imposing their own
regime, which aims at bringing Greece to annihilation’.64
Despite the appropriation of common, world-wide, conspira -
cy theories’ themes and stereotypes, a difference seems to exist
in the Greek case: interestingly, in recent years, Russia was re-in -
 troduced in the domestic conspiracist imagination as a powerful
ally (Ioannidou 2013), reflecting an existing new trend in the
Greek foreign policy, but also the return of an old national myth,
namely the perception of Orthodox Russia as an ally of the
Greeks, as was the case under the Ottoman Empire.
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63. On the Golden Dawn, the Independent Greeks, and the rise of the
far-right and extreme right in Greece during the crisis, see: Georgiadou 2015,
Georgiadou & Rori 2013, Psarras 2012.
64. ANEL, official press release, 2 May 2012; http://www.anexartitoiel -
lines.gr/post.php?post_id=183 (retrieved: 5 June 2017).
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Nationalist discourse and conspiracist rhetoric
The proliferation of conspiracy-oriented explanations of the cri-
sis reflected and at the same time reproduced a common repre-
sentation of the Greek nation as threatened and victimised (Fran-
goudaki and Dragona 1997: 84-85; Skoulariki 2007b; Antoniou
et al. 2015). The perception of a permanent risk of war by neigh-
bouring countries, combined with the feeling of an ‘unjust’ treat-
ment of Greece by the international or European ‘powers’ is a
topos of ethnocentric discourses in the Greek public space. Ac-
cording to this view, Greece is marginalised, its security risks (re-
lated to its geopolitical position) are disregarded, its contribu-
tion to the regional stability not acknowledged, and the long-
term consequences of its tumultuous modern history not taken
into account. 
Based on this discursive background, the conspiracist rhe -
toric became a regular feature of Greek public discourse in the
last decade. There is no doubt that the two phases of conspiracy
theories that we examined above have different traits: in the pe-
riod 2005-2009, the emphasis was on national security issues,
while after 2010, the emphasis was on economy and national
sovereignty. However, there is a clear continuity between the
two, regarding: a) the perception of Greece as being targeted by
foreign malign designs, b) the blame attribution to countries that
represent either national ‘foes’ or hegemonic powers, which have
been responsible for national calamities in the past and are ac-
cused of having a persistent ‘anti-Greek’ (anthelliniki) attitude. 
The aforementioned conspiracist discursive themes reflect
commonplace nationalist patterns of discourse: the representa-
tion of ‘the nation under threat’ and a stereotypical perception
of out-groups as unchangeable over time, essentially aggressive
enemies. Conspiracist discourse could not be embraced if it was
not compatible with widespread schemes of interpretation.
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Conclusion
The conspiracy theories examined here were introduced by of-
ficial sources (government, state intelligence, politicians) and were
reproduced by the media, before they reached the wider public.
As such, they were serving a political purpose or the interest of
a group, they were contested and debated, but eventually were
spread by word of mouth and became commonplace. They had
an impact and were adopted by a large part of the population, be-
cause they corresponded to established stereotypes and because,
despite their imaginative details, they offered a familiar scheme
of interpretation, based on a simple structure: intentionality,
speculation, personification, and denunciation. 
In particular, the alleged assassination plot against the for-
mer PM Karamanlis followed a typical conspiracist scheme: upon
the basic pattern of the initial conspiracy theory, other cases were
added and juxtaposed, until almost all the problematic issues
were treated as part of one and the same plot. In Barkun’s terms
(2003: 6), a ‘systemic’ conspiracy theory was thus developed, in-
terconnecting a series of supposed hostile plots against the gov-
ernment and the Greek state as a whole. 
In consequence, since 2005, the Greek public was exposed
to a public discourse that focused regularly on wire-tapping, fo -
reign intelligence, agents, spies, provocations, clandestine ope -
rations, confidential documents and foreign powers putting pres-
sure on Greece. Part of these accounts may have been true. Most
of them however were exaggerated, uncorroborated and ex-
pressed with a sensational, alarmist and polemical rhetor ic,
which drew hasty conclusions and avoided counter-arguments.
The type of discourse that is characteristic of conspiracy theo-
ries. 
The fact that successive governments, political parties, main-
stream media, and even the judiciary were making or supporting
such claims contrasts with the basic feature of conspiracy theo-
ries, which usually defy official accounts. In the Greek case how-
103CONSPIRACY THEORIES BEFORE AND AFTER THE GREEK CRISIS
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/12/2020 23:36:34 |
ever, the main enemy figure was not the state, which was per-
ceived as weak and ineffective, but foreign powers. 
Even before the crisis, the rhetoric of victimisation had be-
come a key trope of Greek political discourse. The corroboration
of conspiracy narratives by official sources gave them credit,
made the public more receptive to alleged foreign plots and pre-
pared the ground for the dissemination of other conspiracy the-
ories in the following years. After the crisis, Greek society was
even less in a position to filter information, to opt for balanced
analysis, and to resist the attractiveness of conspiracist discourse. 
Pierre-André Taguieff (2013: 17) comments in the intro-
duction of his book on conspiracy theories, referring to the
Greek case: ‘In a situation of  crisis, society becomes illegible to
its members; it appears to them not just complex, but incompre-
hensible and disturbing. When the ordinary certainty is shaken
in a society, when the expectation of  regularity and continuity in
social life is shattered, a space opens up in public opinion in
favour of  conspiracy theories.’
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